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Disorders of ConsciousnessM. A. Bruno1, A. Soddu1, A. Demertzi1, S. Laureys1,2, O. Gosseries1, C. Schnakers1, 
M. Boly1, Q. Noirhomme1, M. Thonnard1, C. Chatelle1, and A. Vanhaudenhuyse1
1University and University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
2University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
Following coma, some patients will recover wakefulness without signs of consciousness (i.e., vegetative state) or
may show nonreflexive movements but with no ability for functional communication (i.e., minimally conscious
state). Currently, there remains a high rate of misdiagnosis of the vegetative state. The increasing use of fMRI and
EEG tools permits the clinical characterization of these patients to be improved. We first discuss “resting metabolism”
and “passive activation” paradigms, used in neuroimaging and evoked potential studies, which merely identify
neural activation reflecting “automatic” processing—that is, occurring without the patient’s willful intervention.
Secondly, we present an alternative approach consisting of instructing subjects to imagine well-defined sensory-
motor or cognitive-mental actions. This strategy reflects volitional neural activation and, hence, witnesses awareness.
Finally, we present results on blood-oxgen-level-dependent “default mode network”/resting state studies that
might be a promising tool in the diagnosis of these challenging patients.
Keywords: Consciousness; Vegetative state; Resting state; fMRI; Active paradigms.
INTRODUCTION
Following severe brain damage, patients classically
evolve through different clinical stages before recov-
ering consciousness. Coma is usually a transient con-
dition that will last no longer than a few days or
weeks and is defined as an “unarousable unrespon-
siveness” (Posner, Saper, Schiff, & Plum, 2007).
After some days or weeks, comatose patients may
open their eyes. When this return to “wakefulness” is
accompanied by reflexive motor activity only, the
condition is called vegetative state (VS; Multi-Society
Task Force on PVS, 1994). Many patients in VS
regain consciousness in the first month after brain
injury. However, if patients show no signs of awareness
1 year after a traumatic brain injury or 3 months after
anoxic accident, the chances of recovering functional
communication are close to zero and the patient is
considered in a permanent VS (Multi-Society Task
Force on PVS, 1994). Those who recover from VS
typically progress to a minimally conscious state
(MCS), which is characterized by minimal but definite
behavioral evidence of awareness of self and/or the
environment (Giacino et al., 2002). Like the VS, the
MCS may be chronic and sometimes permanent.
However, at present, no time-windows for “permanent
Correspondence should be addressed to: S. Laureys, Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center, University and University Hospital
of Liège, Sart-Tilman B30, Liège, Belgium. E-mail: steven.laureys@ulg.ac.be
M. A. Bruno and A. Soddu contributed equally to the manuscript.
SL is Senior Research Associate; AS, MB and QN are Post-doctoral Fellows; and MAB is Research Fellow at the Fonds de la
Recherche Scientifique (FRS). This research was supported by the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (FRS), the European Commission



































194 BRUNO ET AL.
MCS” have been agreed upon. Reliable and consistent
interactive communication and/or functional use of
objects indicate the next boundary in the course of
recovery: emergence from MCS (Giacino et al.,
2002). Finally, some patients may awake from their
coma but be unable to move or speak: the only way
they have to express their consciousness is by small
eye movements. This state is called locked-in syn-
drome (LIS) and is characterized by quadriplegia and
anarthria with general preservation of cognition
(Schnakers et al., 2008a) and an elementary mode
of communication that uses vertical or lateral eye
movements (American Congress of Rehabilitation
Medicine, 1995).
Behavioral assessment is one of the main meth-
ods used to detect awareness in severely brain
injured patients recovering from coma. Clinical
practice shows that recognizing unambiguous signs
of conscious perception in such patients can be very
challenging. Indeed, behavioral assessment is com-
plicated by the presence of motor/language impair-
ment, tracheotomy, fluctuating arousal level or
ambiguous and rapidly habituating responses, which
may partly explain the high frequency of misdiagno-
sis (up to 43%) in these patients (Schnakers et al.,
2009b). This underestimation of the patient’s level
of consciousness can also be explained by other
factors such as poor expertise in behavioral assess-
ment or the use of insensitive behavioral assessment
tools (e.g., using a mirror when evaluating visual
pursuit, behavior that is considered as one of the first
clinical signs differentiating MCS from VS;
Vanhaudenhuyse, Schnakers, Bredart, and Laureys,
2008b). LIS may also be misdiagnosed as coma or
VS possibly due to the rarity of this syndrome, the
difficulty of recognizing unambiguous signs of con-
sciousness, the fluctuation of vigilance in the acute
setting or by additional cognitive or sensory deficits,
such as deafness (Bruno et al., 2009; Schnakers et
al., 2008a; Smart et al., 2008). Misdiagnosis can lead
to grave consequences, especially in end-of-life
decision-making. Contrary to patients in VS, those
in MCS retain some capacity for cognitive process-
ing (see next section). Moreover, the prognosis of
MCS patients is significantly more favorable relative
to those in VS (Giacino, 2004a). Clinical attitudes
and decisions about end-of-life and pain, therefore,
are likely to be influenced by whether one is
diagnosed as a VS or a MCS patient (Demertzi et al.,
2009). New technical methods offer specific assess-
ment procedures and the possibility to determine
objectively whether an unresponsive patient is
aware without explicit verbal or motor response. We
here review neuroimaging studies using positron
emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), and electrophysiological
techniques for the assessment of patients with disor-
ders of consciousness, and present new data on rest-
ing state brain activity in VS patients.
GLOBAL RESTING METABOLISM
Using PET, Levy et al. (1987) first showed that
patients in a VS suffer from a massive cerebral meta-
bolic reduction, estimated to be 40–50% of normal
values. These results have been repeatedly confirmed
by others (Laureys et al., 1999a; Rudolf, Ghaemi,
Haupt, Szelies, & Heiss, 1999; Tommasino, Grana,
Lucignani, Torri, & Fazio, 1995) in VS of different
etiologies and duration. In patients with an LIS, overall
supratentorial cerebral metabolism has been shown to
be preserved partially or fully (Levy et al., 1987),
whereas in comatose patients a decrease of 45% in
cerebral metabolism has been observed (Laureys
et al., 2001). However, a global depression of cerebral
metabolism is not specific to VS or coma only. In
slow wave sleep, overall brain metabolism also
decreases approximately to 40% of normal waking
values while in REM-sleep metabolism returns to
normal values (Maquet et al., 1990). Another example
of transient metabolic depression is observed during
general anesthesia, which is characterized by compa-
rable reduction in cortical metabolism to that
observed in VS (Alkire et al., 1999). However, we
have shown that the relationship between global levels
of brain function and the presence or absence of
awareness is not absolute; rather, some areas in the
brain seem more important than others for the emer-
gence of awareness (Laureys, Faymonville, Moonen,
Luxen, & Maquet, 2000c; Laureys et al., 1999a).
Indeed, VS patients who subsequently recovered con-
sciousness did not show substantial changes in global
metabolic rates for glucose metabolism (Laureys,
Lemaire, Maquet, Phillips, & Franck, 1999b), and
some awake healthy volunteers have global brain
metabolism values comparable to those observed in
some patients in a VS (Laureys, 2005). In VS, a dys-
function was found not in the whole brain but in a
wide frontoparietal network encompassing polymodal
associative cortices: bilateral lateral frontal regions;
parieto-temporal and posterior parietal areas; mesiof-
rontal, posterior cingulated, and precuneal cortices
(Laureys et al., 1999a, 2004a). Posterior cingulate and
adjacent precuneal cortices were reported to differen-
tiate MCS from VS patients (Laureys, Owen, &
Schiff, 2004a; intermediate metabolism in MCS,


































DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 195
controls). More recently, a study on patients in the
chronic stage of traumatic diffuse brain injury
showed a bilateral hypometabolism in the medial
prefrontal regions, the medial frontobasal regions,
the cingulate gyrus, and the thalamus. At the group
level, these regions were more hypometabolic in VS
than MCS patients, but MCS still showed less acti-
vation than patients who have emerged from this
state and who recovered the ability to communicate
(Nakayama, Okumura, Shinoda, Nakashima, &
Iwama, 2006). Specifically, awareness seems
related not exclusively to the activity in the fron-
toparietal network but, as importantly, to the func-
tional connectivity within this network and the
thalami. Indeed, long-range cortico-cortical and
cortico-thalamo-cortical “functional disconnec-
tions” could be identified in the VS (Laureys et al.,
1999a, 2000b).
PASSIVE PARADIGMS: CEREBRAL 
ACTIVATION FROM EXTERNAL 
STIMULATION
Functional neuroimaging
Somatosensory, auditory, and visual perceptions
are conscious experiences; thus, the wakeful
unconsciousness of VS patients, by definition, pre-
cludes these experiences. However, the absence of
a behavioral response cannot be taken as an abso-
lute proof of the absence of consciousness. Several
fMRI activation studies in VS (Coleman et al.,
2007; Di et al., 2007; Fernandez-Espejo et al.,
2008; Moritz et al., 2001; Staffen, Kronbichler,
Aichhorn, Mair, and Ladurner, 2006) have con-
firmed previous PET studies showing preserved
activation of “lower level” primary sensory cortices
which are disconnected from “higher order” associ-
ative cortical networks employing auditory (Boly et
al., 2004; Laureys et al., 2000a; Owen et al., 2002),
somatosensory (Boly et al., 2008a), or visual
(Menon et al., 1998; Owen et al., 2002) stimula-
tions. Similar studies in PET reported that MCS
patients showed a more widespread activation than
VS, with a cortico-cortical functional connectivity
more efficient in MCS compared to VS (Boly et al.,
2004). These results confirmed that MCS patients
may experience pain and hence should systemati-
cally receive appropriate analgesic treatment.
Moreover, stimuli with emotional valence (baby
cries and own name) were shown to induce a much
more widespread activation than did meaningless
noise in the MCS (Laureys et al., 2004b). Stimuli
with emotional valence (the voice of the patient’s
mother compared with an unfamiliar voice) were
also shown to activate amygdala in a traumatic
MCS patient (Bekinschtein et al., 2004). Similarly,
Schiff et al. (2005), in two MCS patients, showed
selective activation in components of the cortical
language networks during presentation of narratives
read by a familiar voice and containing personally
meaningful content. Such context-dependent
higher-order auditory processing shows that con-
tent does matter when talking to MCS patients.
Finally, some exceptional VS patients may also
show higher atypical level of cortical activation in
response to auditory stimulations, and this was pro-
posed to be a surrogate marker of good prognosis
(Di et al., 2007).
Event-related potentials
Event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used for a
long time to assess comatose patients. Early compo-
nents of these potentials arising within 100 ms are
known to persist even in unconscious states. The
later components of exogenous potentials and other
so-called “endogenous” ERP components (e.g.,
P300) are more reliably related to the (unconscious
or conscious) cognitive processing of the informa-
tion, and less frequently observed in disorders of
consciousness (Vanhaudenhuyse, Laureys, & Perrin,
2008a). In several studies, ERPs were used to evalu-
ate the integrity of detection of noncommunicative
patients’ own name, in order to assess the possible
preservation of residual linguistic and self-processing
in these patients. Differential P300 wave to the own
name (as compared to other names) was observed in
LIS patients (Perrin et al., 2006), which is not
surprising since their cognitive functions and their
linguistic comprehension remain preserved (Onofrj,
Thomas, Paci, Scesi, and Tombari, 1997; Schnakers
et al., 2008a). In MCS, results suggested that the
auditory system was relatively preserved in response
to passive tones and language stimulation, implying
that these patients are able to detect salient words
(Perrin et al., 2006). Most surprisingly, some VS
patients emitted a differential P300, although
delayed as compared to age-matched controls (Perrin
et al., 2006). These last results showed that the P300
wave resulting from a passive paradigm is not useful
to successfully distinguish unconscious from
conscious patients. However, in most studies, the
presence of a P300 correlated with favorable out-



































196 BRUNO ET AL.
ACTIVE PARADIGMS: COMMAND 
FOLLOWING IN NONCOMMUNICATIVE 
PATIENTS
Functional neuroimaging
In the absence of a full understanding of the neural
correlates of consciousness, even a near-normal acti-
vation in response to passive stimulations cannot be
considered a proof of the presence of awareness.
Instead, all that can be inferred is that a specific brain
region is, to some degree, still able to perceive and
process relevant sensory stimuli. The question that
arises is how we can disentangle automatic from vol-
untary conscious brain activation. In 2006, Owen
et al. addressed this concern by applying an fMRI par-
adigm in a traumatic VS patient who was asked to
perform two mental imagery tasks (“Imagine playing
tennis” and “Imaging visiting your house”). Activa-
tion was observed in the supplementary motor area
after the patient was asked to imagine playing tennis,
and in parahippocampal gyrus when she was asked to
imagine visiting her house. Similar activation patterns
were seen in healthy volunteers (Boly et al., 2007a).
Importantly, because the only difference between the
conditions that elicited task-specific activation was in
the instruction given at the beginning of each scan-
ning session, the activation observed can only reflect
the intentions of the patient, rather than some altered
property of the outside world. Some could argue that
the words “tennis” and “house” may have automati-
cally triggered the patterns of activation observed in
target brain areas in this patient in the absence of con-
scious awareness. Although it is well documented that
these words elicit wholly automatic neural responses
in the absence of conscious awareness (Hauk, John-
srude, & Pulvermuller, 2004), such responses typi-
cally last for a few seconds and occur in regions of the
brain that are associated with word processing. In this
patient, the observed activity persisted for the full 30 s
of each imagery task and persisted until the patient
was cued with another stimulus indicating that she
should rest. Thus, such responses cannot be explained
in terms of automatic brain processes (Soddu et al.,
2009). In addition, the responses in the patient were
observed not in brain regions that are known to be
involved in word processing but, rather, in regions
that are known to be involved in the two imagery
tasks that she was asked to carry out (Owen et al.,
2007). In this sense, the decision to “imagine playing
tennis” rather than simply “rest” is an act of willed
intention and, therefore, clear evidence for response
to command awareness. The results of this study
should not be misinterpreted as evidence that all
patients in VS may be conscious. Interestingly, when
re-examined six months later, the patient showed
inconsistent signs of consciousness. The most likely
explanation of these results is that the patient was
already beginning the transition to the MCS at the
time of the experiment. This study also highlights the
importance of fMRI as a potentially good marker for
both diagnosis and prognosis (Di et al., 2007).
ERPs
The use of a passive ERP paradigm is not sufficient to
reliably disentangle VS from MCS. Indeed, even if pas-
sive ERP paradigms can highlight ongoing brain pro-
cessing for a given stimulus input, they do not
differentiate between automatic and voluntary cognitive
processes and, therefore, between unconscious and con-
scious patients. For this reason, an active ERPs para-
digm was developed, where the participant is instructed
to voluntarily direct attention to a target stimulus and to
ignore other stimuli (Figure 1) (Schnakers et al., 2008b,
2009a). Group as well as individual results showed that
a larger P300 response to the own name was observed
in MCS patients in active condition as compared to pas-
sive listening. This P300 amplitude was otherwise equi-
valent to that observed in controls, while no task-related
P300 changes in VS patients were observed (Schnakers
et al., 2008b). This suggests that MCS patients were
able to voluntarily focus their attention on the target as a
function of task requirements. This active ERPs para-
digm permitted to detect consciousness in a total LIS
patient (i.e., characterized by complete immobility
including all eye movements; Bauer, Gerstenbrand, &
Rumpl, 1979) that behaviorally would be diagnosed as
comatose (Schnakers et al., 2009a). In a similar way,
conscious processing was detected in three out of four
MCS patients who were instructed to actively count the
number of deviant trials in series of sound, while no
response were recorded in VS patients (Bekinschtein
et al., 2009).
RESTING STATE fMRI PARADIGM: A 
NEW TOOL TO CATEGORIZE 
DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
PATIENTS?
Resting state fMRI acquisitions are easy to perform and
could have a potentially broader and faster translation
into clinical practice. Recent studies on spontaneous
fluctuations in the fMRI blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) signal recorded in “resting” awake healthy


































DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 197
among functionally defined neuroanatomical networks
(Boly et al., 2008b; Raichle, 2006). The concept of a
“default mode network” describes a set of brain areas
exhibiting task-induced deactivations, encompassing
precuneus, posterior parietal lobe, and medial prefrontal
cortex, which are more active at rest than when we are
involved in attention-demanding cognitive tasks (Rai-
chle et al., 2001). The clinical interest of default net-
work MRI studies is that they allow the investigation of
higher order cognitive networks without requiring
patients’ active participation, particularly important in
VS and MCS. We here compared default mode network
in VS and brain-dead patients with healthy volunteers.
Patients
We first created a healthy control template of the
default mode network (DMN) by analyzing 11 volun-
teers (age range 21–60 years; 4 women). Secondly,
we compared 4 brain injured patients (3 vegetative:
1 ischemia, 1 encephalopathy, 1 traumatic; and 1 hem-
orrhagic brain-dead patients (published in Boly et al.,
2009), age range 27–77 years, all men) to 9 other
healthy volunteers (age range 29–65 years, 5 women).
In patients, clinical examination was repeatedly per-
formed using standardized scales (the Coma Recovery
Scale Revised, Giacino Kalmar, & Whyte, 2004b; and
the Glasgow Liege scale, Born, 1988) on the day of
scanning, and in the week before and the week after.
Patients were scanned in an unsedated condition. The
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Medical School of the University of Liège. Informed
consent to participate to the study was obtained from
the subjects themselves in the case of healthy subjects,
and from the legal surrogates of the patients.
Data acquisition and analysis
In all participants, resting state BOLD data were
acquired on a 1.5 T MR scanner (Symphony Tim,
Figure 1. Illustration of active and passive event-related potential paradigms in a 22-year-old locked-in syndrome patient. Upper panel
depicts the patient’s response to an unfamiliar name (listened nontarget unfamiliar name, in blue) as compared with active condition
(responded to target unfamiliar name, in red). Lower panel depicts the patient’s own-name response in the passive condition (listened nontarget


































198 BRUNO ET AL.
Siemens, Germany) with a gradient echo-planar
sequence using axial slice orientation (36 slices; voxel
size = 3.75 × 3.75 × 3.6 mm3; matrix size = 64 × 64 ×
36; repetition time = 3000 ms; echo time = 30 ms; flip
angle = 90°; field of view = 240 mm). A protocol of
200 scans with a duration of 10 min was performed.
fMRI data were preprocessed using BrainVoyager soft-
ware (R. Goebel, Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The
Netherlands). Preprocessing of functional scans
included 3D motion correction, linear trend removal,
slice scan time correction, and filtering out of low fre-
quencies of up to 0.005 Hz. The data were spatially
smoothed with a Gaussian filter of full width at half
maximum value of 8 mm. Independent component ana-
lysis (ICA) was performed with BrainVoyager using
30 components (Ylipaavalniemi & Vigario, 2008). An
average template DMN map was calculated on 11
healthy subjects. We performed, as implemented in
BrainVoyager (self-organizing ICA; Esposito et al.,
2005), a spatial similarity test on single subjects inde-
pendent components (IC) and we averaged the maps of
the ICs belonging to the same cluster. The cluster cor-
responding to the DMN was selected by visual inspec-
tion. In order to select the DMN for each subject and
patient, we run self-organizing ICA with the average
ICs coming from the 11 healthy subjects template and
we picked the component clustering with the DMN
template (spatial similarity test). Self-organizing ICA
could assign a similarity value that indicates how well
the selected IC fitted the average DMN map based on
the 11 subjects (the similarity test was based only on
spatial properties without excluding components with a
power spectrum dominated by high frequency). The
same protocol of 200 scans was acquired on a spherical
phantom. Finally, a two-tailed unequal variance Stu-
dent t-test compared the spatial similarity values of the
selected DMN map in healthy controls compared to VS
patients. Three motion indices were introduced describ-
ing the motion of patients compared to healthy con-
trols: the mean frequency calculated as the mean of the
frequency of each motion curve (three translations and
three rotations), the mean over time of the full displace-
ment during the acquisition calculated as the square
root of the sum of the squares of the six motion param-
eters, and the mean over time of the displacement
speed during the acquisition calculated as the square
root of the sum of the squares of the six motion param-
eters variation over one time unit (repetition time).
RESULTS
A healthy controls mean spatial map identified the
DMN pattern (Figure 2a) showing full overlap with
the template identified by the black and white contour.
The principal brain regions characterizing the DMN,
posterior cingulate/precuneal, mesiofrontal and poste-
rior parietal cortices, were detected. Compared to con-
trols, VS patients showed a significant lower spatial
similarity (0.47 ± 0.08, range 0.33–0.55 vs. 0.23 ± 0.12,
range 0.12–0.35; p = .05). The brain-dead patient (and
the phantom) also showed lower spatial similarity com-
pared to controls with values in the VS range. Finally,
none of the VS patients showed a DMN with a spatial
pattern comparable with healthy controls (Figure 2b–d),
as assessed by visual inspection, even if in the case of
V1 the spatial similarity had a value consistent with
healthy subjects (Table 1). Rapid transient “clonic”
motions (i.e., spasmodic changes of muscular contrac-
tion) were observed for VS1 and VS3 as also confirmed
by spatial maps’ periphery patterns. The brain-dead
patient didn’t show any significant spatial pattern, con-
firming results of Boly and collaborators (2009).
DISCUSSION
After creating a template of the DMN, we identified
the DMN at the single subject level, in a user-inde-
pendent manner. In healthy volunteers, the identified
component showed the typical spatial pattern of the
DMN (Beckmann, DeLuca, Devlin, & Smith, 2005).
In VS patients, as well as in the brain-dead, we failed
to show any consistent pattern of DMN, even if single
subjects brain activation maps showed residual con-
nectivity in VS. In our view, these residual connectiv-
ity patterns are not reflecting residual DMN neuronal
activity but could be explained by movement artifacts.
Cardiorespiratory and vascular effects could also be a
source of artifactual connectivity. BOLD signal
changes within regions of the DMN have been found
to be reduced after correcting for cardiorespiratory
effects (van Buuren et al., 2009). In addition, it should
be stressed that altered blood flow and physiology,
such as neurovascular decoupling, could also effect
the BOLD signal detected in fMRI (Logothetis, Pauls,
Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001), especially in
the context of traumatic and ischemic encephalopa-
thy. This of course cannot exclude the absence of neu-
ral activity in these patients (Boly et al., 2009; van
Buuren et al., 2009). Boly and collaborators (2009)
showed that correlations with posterior cingulate
cortex are reduced in one VS as compared to age-
matched controls, and argued that this reduced
functional connectivity within the DMN in VS was in
line with the hypothesis that spontaneous fMRI signal
changes may be partly related to ongoing interoceptive


































DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 199
Figure 2. Resting state EPI–BOLD acquisition in (a) 9 healthy volunteers, with a spatial map obtained by running a random effect group
GLM analysis using as predictors the time courses of the ICs selected as default mode (thresholded at false discovery rate corrected p < .05)
within default mode mask obtained from an independent dataset (the 11 healthy controls for the independent study) shown as black and white
contour volume of interest. (b–d) 3 vegetative patients and (e) 1 brain death with spatial maps obtained by running a GLM analysis using as


































200 BRUNO ET AL.
Motion, pulse, and respiratory artifacts remain a very
important problem to tackle to be able to properly assess
patients with disorders of consciousness. If recording
heart and respiratory rates during the acquisition can
help in disentangling neuronal activity from pulse and
respiratory artifacts (Gray et al., 2009), further investi-
gations are needed to disentangle effects of motion and
neuronal activity in the BOLD signal. In the brain-dead
patient, who fulfilled all the standard clinical criteria for
brain death (previously published in Boly et al., 2009),
fMRI results did not show any long-range significant
functional connectivity, confirming that the origin of the
BOLD signal was fully due to motion artifacts as
expected due to the complete absence of neuronal activ-
ity in brain death. Finally, future work should study the
relationship between structural and functional connec-
tivity changes in noncommunicative brain-damaged
patients. Functional connectivity in DMN has indeed
been related to underlying structural anatomy (Greicius,
Supekar, Menon, & Dougherty, 2009). Further multi-
modal studies should combine resting state fMRI data
with structural MRI (e.g. diffusion tensor imaging data).
CONCLUSION
Patients with disorders of consciousness represent a
major clinical problem in terms of clinical assessment,
treatment, and daily management. The nonresponsive-
ness of such patients implies that they can only be
diagnosed by means of exclusion criteria such as “no
goal-directed eye movements” or “no execution of com-
mands.” Those behavioral signs may be very slight and
short-term and performance may fluctuate. Integration of
neuroimaging and ERPs techniques should improve our
ability to disentangle diagnostic and prognostic differ-
ences on the basis of underlying mechanisms and better
guide our clinical therapeutic options in these challeng-
ing patients. A step-by-step approach combining multi-
modal assessment techniques (i.e., PET scan, fMRI, and
ERPs) seems to be appropriate to detect signs of con-
sciousness (Figure 3). Resting metabolism and passive
paradigms studies increased our understanding of resid-
ual cerebral processing of VS and MSC patients. Active
paradigms seem to provide an objective valuable addi-
tional diagnostic tool in cases of patients with atypical
activation, leading to persisting doubts in clinical diag-
nosis. Negative results, however, must be cautiously
interpreted in case of patients with severely altered level
of vigilance, which could present only transient activity
in response to the presentation of instructions. Passive
and active fMRI paradigms were also shown to poten-
tially be a useful tool to predict possibility of recovery.
Finally, results on the DMN seem promising to dis-
tinguish patients with disorders of consciousness by
evaluating preservation of connectivity in this resting
state network. However, future studies are needed to
give a full characterization of default mode connectivity
in VS and MCS patients and its potential use in outcome
prediction. Future clinical studies should also perform
TABLE 1 
Spatial and temporal properties of the independent component selected as default mode (DM) from resting state fMRI in healthy 














Control 1 0.33 1.5 0.04 0.03 0.6 0.04
Control 2 0.51 2.9 0.05 0.06 0.3 0.14
Control 3 0.37 1.8 0.05 0.03 1.7 0.09
Control 4 0.50 2.8 0.05 0.06 0.4 0.14
Control 5 0.54 3.2 0.07 0.05 0.8 0.25
Control 6 0.39 2 0.04 0.04 0.3 0.02
Control 7 0.55 3.2 0.05 0.03 3.0 0.09
Control 8 0.54 3.2 0.05 0.04 0.3 0.03
Control 9 0.47 2.6 0.04 0.03 0.8 0.05
VS 1 0.35 1.7 0.04 0.05 1.1 0.14
VS 2 0.23 0.8 0.07 0.05 0.2 0.28
VS 3 0.12 –0.1 0.04 0.03 5.9 0.50
BD 0.13 0 0.07 0.06 0.1 0.27
Phantom 0.12 –0.1 0.06 0.03 0.1 0.24
Notes: Spatial similarity with an average-template-default mode based on an independent 11 healthy controls data set, normalized variation of
spatial similarity (Sim) respect to the brain death (BD) (Sim_subject-Sim_BD)/Sim_BD), and default mode time course mean frequency. Motion
properties (means calculated from the six motion curves). Rapid transient “clonic” motions were observed for two of the three patients (VS1 and


































DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 201
heart rate and respiratory rate recording and simultane-
ous real movement monitoring, which would improve
default mode analyses.
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